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640 GoMEZ v. SuPERIOR CouRT [50 C.2d 
[Sac. No. 6928. In Bank. July 17, 1958.] 
ANTHONY GOMEZ et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR 
COURT OP MENDOCINO COUNTY et al., Respondents. 
[1a, lb] Criminal Law-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-
The distinction heretofore drawn by the courts that one con-
victed of a lesser offense necessarily included in the charge 
of a greater may not be tried again on a charge that he has 
committed the greater offense, but that, with respect to a 
crime divided into degrees, a conviction of a lower degree of 
the crime does not operate as an acquittal of the higher, is not 
based on sound reason, and neither the Constitution nor the 
statutes require one to be drawn. 
[2] Id.-Former Jeopardy.-The state with all its resources and 
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to 
convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subject-
ing him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling 
him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as 
well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he 
may be found guilty. 
[3] Larceny-Grand and Petty Theft.-The distinctions between 
grand and petty theft are in the type of article stolen, whether 
the article was taken from the person of another and in its 
value (Pen. Code, §§ 484, 487, 487a, 488); the elements of the 
crime remain the same with the exceptions noted. 
[4] Criminal Law-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-No 
distinction should be drawn between lesser included, although 
differently defined, crimes and crimes of a lesser degree inso-
far as the question of double jeopardy is concerned. 
[5] Id.- Former Jeopardy- Identity of Offenses.-Prosecutions 
are for the same offense when they are for violations of the 
same provisions of the criminal law and when the facts on 
which they are based are the same. 
[6] Id.-Plea-Double Jeopardy.-Defendants seeking dismissal 
of grand theft charges subsequent to reversal of a petty theft 
conviction did not waive their rights to urge the question of 
double jeopardy, though the plea did not name the court, place 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 94 et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 173 et seq.; Am.Jur., Crim-
inal Law, § 359 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4, 5, 8] Criminal Law, § 145; [2] 
Criminal Law, § 117; [3] Larceny, § 2; [6] Criminal Law, § 199; 
[7] Criminal Law, § 206; [9] Prohibition, § 14(2); Mandamus, 
§ 15(9). 
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and time of the former trial (Pen. Code, § 1017, subds. 3, 4), 
where the plea was substantially in the form prescribed by 
Pen. Code, § 1017. 
[7] Id.-Plea-Waiver.-Defendants seeking dismissal of grand 
theft charges subsequent to reversal of a petty theft conviction 
did not waive their plea of double jeopardy by appealing from 
the former conviction, though Pen. Code, § 1262, provides that 
"If a judgment against the defendant is reversed, such reversal 
shall be deemed an order for a new trial, unless the appellate 
court shall otherwise direct," and though Pen. Code, § 1180, 
declares that "The granting of a new trial places the parties 
in the same position as if no trial had been had"; the code 
sections are not a bar to a plea of double jeopardy, and de-
fendants should not be forced to choose between appealing 
an erroneous conviction of petty theft and their constitutional 
guarantee that they shall not twice be placed in jeopardy for a 
charge of grand theft. 
[8] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of O:lfenses.-Double jeopardy 
attaches when defendants are threatened with a second trial 
on a grand theft charge of which they were impliedly acquitted 
at the first trial on being found guilty only of petty theft. 
[9] Prohibition-Adequacy of Other Remedies: Mandamus-Exist-
ence of Other Remedy.-Prohibition to restrain the superior 
court from trying defendants on a grand theft charge subse-
quent to reversal of their conviction of petty theft under an 
indictment charging either grand or petty theft, and mandamus 
to compel the superior court to transfer the cause to the appro-
priate justice court for disposition of the petty theft charge, 
are proper remedies where the remedy at law is neither speedy 
nor adequate under the facts, and especially where the ques-
tion before the court is one of jurisdiction to place defendants 
again on trial for the offense charged. 
PROCEEDINGS in prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court of Mendocino County and Hale McCowen, Judge 
thereof, from proceeding with the trial of a criminal action, 
and in mandamus to compel that court to transfer the cause to 
the appropriate justice court. Writs granted. 
Kasch & Cook and Leo M. Cook for Petitioners. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier and 
J. M. Sanderson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-Petitioners, Anthony Gomez and Ray Cardi-
nal, seek writs of prohibition and mandate against the supe-
rior Court of the County of Mendocino. Petitioners seek the 
50 C.2d-2l 
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writ of prohibition to restrain the superior court from pro-
ceeding with the trial of the grand theft charge and the writ 
of mandate to compel the superior court to transfer the cause 
to the appropriate justice court for the disposition of the 
charge of petty theft. 
On March 19, 1957, an information was filed against peti-
tioners charging them with a felony, the violation of section 
484 of the Penal Code.* Petitioners were accused of the theft 
of a P & H Loading Shovel of the value of $3,000, the personal 
property of one Casteel, to which charge they pleaded not 
guilty. The cause was tried to a jury which, after trial and 
argument, had submitted to it three forms of verdict: (1) 
Guilty of grand theft; (2) guilty of petty theft; and (3) not 
guilty. The verdict of the jury was that petitioners were 
guilty of petty theft. The court pronounced judgment and 
sentenced each of them to pay a $500 fine and serve a six 
months' term in the county jail. Petitioners appealed, and 
the District Court of Appeal reversed the judgment because 
of prejudicial misconduct on the part of the district attorney 
(People v. Cardinal, 154 Cal.App.2d 835 [316 P.2d 1001], 
October 31, 1957). 
From the opinion of the District Court of Appeal (154 Cal. 
App.2d 835), it appears that petitioners admitted that they 
dismantled and sold as scrap, a loading shovel which they said 
they had purchased from one Berry who purported to be the 
owner thereof. A receipt bearing the signature "W. H. 
*"Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive 
away the personal property of another, or who shall fraudulently appro-
priate property which has been entrusted to him, or who shall knowingly 
and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, 
defraud any other person of money, labor or real or personal property, 
or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his wealth or 
mercantile character and by thus imposing upon any person, obtains 
credit and thereby fraudulently gets or obtains possession of money, or 
property or obtains the labor or service of another, is guilty of theft. 
In determining the value of the property obtained, for the purposes of 
this section, the reasonable and fair market value shall be the test, 
and in determining the value of services received the contract price 
shall be the test. If there be no contract price, the reasonable and going 
wage for the service rendered shall govern. For the purposes of this 
section, any false and fraudulent representation or pretense made shall 
be treated as continuing, so as to cover any money, property or service 
received as a result thereof, and the complaint, information or indict-
ment may charge that the crime was committed on any date during 
the particular period in question. The hiring of any additional employee 
or employees without advising each of them of every labor claim due 
and unpaid and every judgment that the employer has been unable to 
meet shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud.'' (Pen. Code, 
§ 484.) 
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Berry" was introduced in evidence but Berry was not pro-
duced as a witness. 
Petitioners now allege that they have been ordered to pro-
ceed to trial on a charge of grand theft; that they have moved 
the respondent to dismiss the grand theft charge against them 
on the ground that they have been once in jeopardy and have 
been acquitted of the grand theft charge; that respondent has 
no jurisdiction to try them on the sole remaining charge of 
petty theft and that the matter should be transferred to the 
Justice Court for the Little I1ake Judicial District, Mendo-
cino County, which is the appropriate court for the retrial of 
the petty theft charge. 
Section 687 of the Penal Code provides that "No person can 
be subjected to a second prosecution for a public offense for 
which he has once been prosecuted and convicted or ac-
quitted." Section 1023 of the Penal Code provides: "When 
the defendant is convicted or acquitted or has been once placed 
in jeopardy upon an accusatory pleading, the conviction, 
acquittal, or jeopardy is a bar to another prosecution for the 
offense charged in such accusatory pleading, or for an attempt 
to commit the same, or for an offense necessarily included 
therein, of which he might have been convicted under that 
accusatory pleading.'' Article I, section 13, of the California 
Constitution provides, in part, that "No person shall be twice 
put in jeopardy for the same offense .... " 
[la] In California a distinction has been drawn by the 
courts to the effect that where one is convicted of a lesser 
offense necessarily included in the charge of a greater offense, 
he may not be tried again on a charge that he has committed 
the greater offense. On the other hand, where a crime 
divided into degrees is concerned, a conviction of a lower 
degree of the crime has been held not to operate as an 
acquittal of the higher degree. In other words, it has been 
held that where one is found guilty of a lesser and necessarily 
included offense he has been placed in jeopardy and cannot 
again be tried for the greater offense with which he was 
originally charged; but where one is found guilty of second 
degree burglary, for example, the conviction is not considered 
an acquittal of a charge of first degree burglary or that the 
defendant has been once in jeopardy. The reasoning appears 
to be that in the crimes which are divided into degrees but 
one crime or offense has been charged and that a reversal 
by an appellate court, or the granting of a new trial operates 
to set aside the whole verdict leaving the entire matter at 
644 GoMEZ v. SuPERIOR CouRT [50 C.2d 
large. Petitioners here rely on the cases holding that the 
conviction of a lesser offense operates as an acquittal of the 
greater charged offense (People v. Gilmore, 4 Cal. 376 [60 
Am.Dec. 620] ; People v. Gordon, 99 Cal. 227 [33 P. 901] ; 
In re Hess, 45 Cal.2d 171 [288 P.2d 5] ), and the People rely 
on the cases where "degree" crimes were involved (People v. 
Kee[e1·, 65 Cal. 232 [3 P. 818]; People v. McNeer, 14 Cal.App. 
2d 22 [57 P.2d 1018]; In re Moore, 29 Cal.App.2d 56 [84 
P.2d 57]).* 
In the recent case of Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 
184 [78 S.Ct. 221, 2 I1.Ed.2d 199, 61 A.L.R.2d 1119], where 
a prosecution for first degree murder was involved, a divided 
court held that where a jury had found the defendant guilty 
of second degree murder, and on appeal the conviction was 
reversed, the defendant could not be again tried for first 
degree murder because to do so would place him twice in 
jeopardy for the same offense in violation of the constitutional 
guarantee contained in the Fifth Amendment. The People 
contend that the double jeopardy provisions of the federal 
Constitution have never been applied to the states and that 
the rule of the Green case is not determinative of the case 
at bar. 
There appears to be no sound reason for the distinction 
drawn by the California cases, and our constitutional provi-
sion and statutes certainly do not require one to be drawn. 
[2] As Mr. Justice Black pointed out in the Green case, "The 
underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least 
the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State 
with all its resources and power should not be allowed to 
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged 
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense 
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of 
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility 
that even though innocent he may be found guilty." (78 
S.Ct. 221, 223.) In California, burglary is a crime divided 
into two degrees. It is defined as follows: ''Every person who 
enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, 
store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse or other building, tent, 
vessel, railroad car, trailer coach as defined in the Vehicle 
Code ... with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any 
felony is guilty of burglary." (Pen. Code, § 459.) Section 
460 provides: '' 1. Every burglary of an inhabited dwelling-
house or building committed in the night-time, and every 
"Plea of double jeopardy held waived in burglary case. 
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burglary, whether in the daytime or night-time, committed by 
a person armed with a deadly weapon, or who while in the 
commission of such burglary arms himself with a deadly 
weapon, or who while in the commission of such burglary 
assaults any person, is burglary of the first degree. 
"2. All other kinds of burglary are of the second degree." 
If a person .is accused of first degree burglary, and under 
the evidence a jury returns a verdict of second degree bur-
glary, it has impliedly found that the accused did not enter 
an inhabited dwelling-house in the nighttime, or was not 
armed with a deadly weapon during the commission of the 
crime, or that he did not assault any person during the com-
mission of the crime. Insofar as the elements of the crime 
of burglary are concerned, they remain the same except for 
the difference between the two degrees, and since the jury 
had before it all of the evidence pertaining to the crime 
allegedly committed by the accused, the distinction in the two 
lines of cases appears unsound. The elements necessary for 
first degree murder differ from those of second degree murder 
in much the same way. A jury impliedly decides that the 
necessary element of the greater crime is lacking under the 
evidence and returns a verdict finding the defendant guilty 
of the lesser degree. 
In the case under consideration, petitioners were charged 
with grand theft of an article of the alleged value of $3,000. 
The jury found them guilty of petty theft-or, in other words, 
the jury which heard the evidence found them guilty, but 
impliedly determined that the value of the article stolen did 
not exceed $200. 
[3] The distinctions between grand and petty theft accord-
ing to the Penal Code are in the type of article stolen, whether 
the article was taken from the person of another and in 
the value thereof. (Pen. Code, §§ 484, 487, 487a, 488.) The 
elements of the crime remain the same with the exceptions 
noted. In People v. Ny Sam Chung (1892), 94 Cal. 304, 307 
[29 P. 642, 28 Am.St.Rep. 29], a prosecution for grand larceny 
was held barred after the court had dismissed a charge of 
petty larceny against the defendants. The court said: "It 
follows that if defendants were placed in jeopardy by reason 
of the proceedings in the police court, their trial in the supe-
rior court was a second jeopardy, and they are entitled to their 
discharge." This case was, of course, decided prior to the 
1927 amalgamation of the crimes of larceny, embezzlement, 
false pretenses and kindred offenses under the cognomen of 
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theft. However, no elements of the former crimes have been 
changed. In People v. Myers, 206 Cal. 480, 483 [275 P. 219], 
the court was discussing the change made by the 1927 amend-
ment and held: "No elements of the former crimes have been 
changed by addition or subtraction. This is particularly true 
of the crime of larceny. All former elements of this offense 
are perpetuated and contained in section 484 as amended.'' 
In the Ny Sam Chung case the question presented was whether 
the defendants had stolen a gold bracelet of the value of $27 
from Jeong Koong. After the evidence was all in, the prose-
cuting attorney suggested that the property had been taken 
from the person of Koong and that the offense was grand 
larceny, rather than petty larceny. The court ordered the 
action dismissed and the defendants were thereafter placed on 
trial in the superior court on a charge of grand larceny "upon 
an information alleging the same facts set out in the complaint 
in the police court, and the further fact that the property was 
taken from the person of said Jeong Koong. '' This court 
specifically held that defendants had been once in jeopardy 
and the judgment and order was reversed "with directions to 
discharge the defendants and dismiss the proceedings.'' Inas-
much as the elements of the crime remain the same, there 
appears to be no reason to distinguish the Ny Sam Chung case 
on the ground that it was decided prior to the 1927 legislation 
heretofore considered. In People v. Stanhope, 37 Cal.App.2d 
631 [99 P.2d 1075], defendant was charged with grand theft, 
"to which accusation he entered a plea of not guilty, was 
tried before a jury, and convicted of the lesser offense of 
petty theft. His motion for a new trial having been denied 
and probation granted, the defendant appeals from the order 
denying him a new trial.'' In affirming the judgment, the 
court said : ''In view of the provisions of section 487 and 488 
of the Penal Code, it is at once apparent that the jury resolved 
the doubt concerning the amount of money involved, in appel-
lant's favor and found him guilty of petty theft. If this was 
error, it was certainly error of which appellant cannot com-
plain." (P. 636.) In other words, the court considered the 
crime of petty theft necessarily included in a charge of grand 
theft. In People v. Simpson, 26 Cal.App.2d 223, 229 [79 
P .2d 119], where the jury improperly fixed the defendants' 
guilt as grand theft, the appellate court modified the judg-
ment so as to find the degree of the crime to be petty theft. 
In other words, the appellate decision was a recognition of 
the fact that petty theft is necessarily included within a charge 
July 1958] GoMEZ v. SuPERIOR CouRT 
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of grand theft. In People v. Kelley, 208 Cal. 387, 391 [281 
P. 609], where the defendant was found guilty of first degree 
murder by a jury, this court modified the judgment so as to 
find the defendant guilty of manslaughter. It was held that 
"Section 1181 of the Penal Code,* as amended in 1927 ( Stats. 
1927, p.1037), which must now be considered for the first time 
by this court, provides that if the evidence (in criminal causes) 
shows the defendant to be not guilty of the degree of the crime 
of which he was convicted, but guilty of a lesser degree thereof 
or of a lesser crime included therein, the trial court may 
modify the judgment accordingly without granting or order-
ing a new trial, and this power shall extend to any court to 
which the cause may be appealed." (Emphasis added.) (See 
also People v. Castro, 37 Cal.App.2d 311, 315 [99 P.2d 374] ; 
People v. Cowan, 38 Cal.App.2d 231, 248 [101 P.2d 125], 
reduction of conviction of first degree murder to that of 
second degree; People v. La]l'leur, 42 Cal.App.2d 50, 57 [108 
P.2d 99], reduction of conviction of first degree murder to 
that of second degree; People v. Lynch, 60 Cal.App.2d 133, 
145 [140 P.2d 418], conviction of first degree burglary re-
versed because "as a matter of law he [defendant] was 
entitled to a finding pursuant to section 1097 of the Penal 
Code that the offense was of the second degree''; People v. 
Slater, 60 Cal.App.2d 358, 371 [140 P.2d 846], conviction of 
second degree murder reduced to manslaughter; People v. 
Daniel, 65 Cal.App.2d 622, 636 [151 P.2d 275], conviction 
of first degree murder reduced to second degree murder.) 
[ 4] The above cited cases make no distinction between lesser 
included, although differently defined, crimes and crimes of a 
lesser degree when the question involved is whether the appel-
late court should modify the judgment without ordering a 
new trial. It appears to us that no distinction should be 
drawn insofar as the question of double jeopardy is con-
cerned. 
In People v. Greer, 30 Cal.2d 589, 596, 597 [184 P.2d 512), 
defendant was charged with both statutory rape and lewd 
and lascivious conduct. In reversing, we said : ''The test in 
this state of a necessarily included offense is simply that 
*"When the verdict or finding is contrary to law or evidence, but if 
the evidence shows the defendant to be not guilty of the degree of the 
crime of which he was conYicted, but guilty of a lesser degree thereof, 
or of a lesser crime included therein, the court may modify the verdict, 
finding or judgment accordingly without granting or ordering a new 
trial, and this power shall extend to any court to which the cause may be 
appealed. . . '' (Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. 6; italicized words added by 
1951 amdt.) 
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where an offense cannot be committed without necessarily 
committing another offense, the latter is a necessarily included 
offense. (People v. Krupa, 64 Cal.App.2d 592, 598 [149 P.2d 
416] .) Thus, a prosecution for battery cannot be followed 
by a prosecution for assault based upon the same acts. An 
assault is a necessary element of battery, and it is impossible 
to commit battery without assaulting the victim. The assault, 
to adopt the statutory language, is 'necessarily included 
therein.' (People v. McDaniels, 137 Cal. 192, 194 [69 P. 
1006, 92 Am.St.Rep. 81, 59 L.R.A. 578] .) 
''Although section 1023 refers to a situation where the 
prosecution for the greater offense is first in time, there is no 
such limitation in the cases. If the defendant is tried first 
for assault and later for battery, the prosecution for the in-
cluded offense bars the subsequent prosecution for the greater 
offense. (People v. McDaniels, supra, at p. 195; People v. 
Defoor, 100 Cal. 150, 154 [34 P. 642] ; People v. Ny Sam 
Chung, 94 Cal. 304, 306 [29 P. 642, 28 Am.St.Rep. 29] ; see 
Official Draft on Double Jeopardy, supra, § 17 ; 1 Bishop's 
Criminal Law (9th ed.) § 1057; 2 Freeman on Judgments 
(5th ed.) § 559.) 'A conviction of the lesser is held to be a 
bar to [the] prosecution for the greater on the theory that 
to convict of the greater would be to convict twice of the 
lesser.' (People v. Krttpa, sttpra, at p. 598.) If this were 
not the rule, section 1023 could be vitiated by the simple device 
of beginning with a prosecution of the lesser offense and pro-
ceeding up the scale.'' (For an excellent discussion on neces-
sarily included offenses, see People v. Marshall, 48 Cal.2d 394 
[309 P.2d 456].) 
[5] Viewing the matter realistically it appears that dr-
fendants here would be tried again on the same set of facts 
as prevailed when they were found guilty of petty theft. The 
American Law Institute defines ''same offense'' as follows: 
"Prosecutions are for the same offense when they are for 
violations of the same provisions of the criminal law and 
when the facts on which they are based are the same." (Em-
phasis added; Official Draft on Double Jeopardy, Adminis-
tration of the Criminal Law, American Law Institute, § 5.) 
(See also People v. Defoor, 100 Cal. 150 [34 P. 642] ; People v. 
McDaniels, 137 Cal. 192 [69 P. 1006, 92 Am.St.Rep. 81, 59 
L.R.A. 578].) 
While it is true as argued by the People that the double 
jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States have not definitely been held ap-
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plicable to the states as encompassed in the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the language in the Green 
case (78 S.Ct. 221, supra) is certainly persuasive. (And see 
Haag v. State, 356 U.S. 464 [78 S.Ct. 829, 2 L.Ed.2d 913], 
dissenting opinion of Justices Douglas and Black.) The 
guarantee against double jeopardy in the California Consti-
tution is almost precisely the Rame as that found in the federal 
Constitution. Article I, section 13, of our Constitution is 
entitled "CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS-RIGHTS OF AccusED. DuE 
PRocEss OF I1AW . • JEOPARDY. CoMMENT ON FAILURE OF DEFEND-
AN'l' 'l'O TESTIFY. DEPOSITIONS." It would appear from this that 
the framers of our Constitution considered the prohibition 
against twice in jeopardy as part of the concept of due process 
of law. In the Green case (p. 229) the court said: "We believe 
that if either of the rationales offered to support the Trono 
result [Trona v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (26 S.Ct. 121, 
50 L.Ed. 292)] were adopted here it would unduly impair the 
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. The right 
not to be placed in jeopardy more than once for the same 
offense is a vital safeguard in our society, one that was dearly 
won and one that should continue to be highly valued. If 
such great constitutional protections are given a narrow, 
grudging application they are deprived of much of their 
significance. We. do not feel that Trono or any other decision 
by this Court compels us to forego the conclusion that a 
second trial of Green for first degree murder was contrary 
to both the letter and spirit of the Fifth Amendment.'' It 
appears to us that if the spurious distinction made by the 
California cases is perpetuated in the case at bar we would 
be giving our constitutional prohibition against twice in 
jeopardy a "narrow, grudging application" unsupported by 
either logic or reason. 
[6] The People argue that defendants have waived their 
rights to urge the question of double jeopardy. This contention 
appears to be based first on the ground that the question of 
double jeopardy was not raised by plea as required by sections 
1016 and 1017 of the Penal Code. A copy of the minute 
order, dated March 21, 1958, in the case of People of the State 
of California, plaintiff, v. Anthony Gomez and Ray Cardinal, 
defendants, Number 3124-C, is as foJlows: "This matter came 
on at this time to be set, both defendants present; Frank 
Petersen, Deputy District Attorney appearing for the People 
and Leo Cook appearing as counsel for defendants. Defend-
ants entered pleas of Not Guilty by reasons once in jeopardy 
650 GorvrEz v. SuPERIOR CovRT [50 C.2d 
and of prior acquittal. Request by counsel for release upon 
own recognizance or that bail be reduced denied. Order that 
bail remain as is. It is ordered that the matter be and is set 
for trial May 5, 6, and 7, 1958 and on the calendar April 25, 
1958 to draw jury.'' While the minute order does not show 
that defendants named the court, the place and the time, of 
the former trial (Pen. Code, § 1017, subds. 3, 4), it appears 
that the statute was substantially followed since it is pro-
vided: ''Every plea must be made in open court and may be 
oral or in writing, and must be entered upon the minutes of 
the court and must be taken down in shorthand by the official 
reporter if there is one present. The plea, whether oral or 
in writing, must be in substantially the following form .... '' 
(Pen. Code, § 1017.) In re Burns, 78 Cal.App.2d 294 [177 
P.2d 649], relied upon by the People is not in point since there 
the defendants sought to raise the plea of once in jeopardy 
by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after a third trial 
in which all five of them were found guilty. (The first two 
trials had resulted in disagreements of the jury.) In re Har-
ron, 191 Cal. 457, 469 [217 P. 728], relied upon by the People, 
was also a proceeding in habeas corpus brought after the 
defendant was convicted upon a second complaint for battery 
and after the judgment had become final. The court held 
that ''after final judgment, habeas corp1ts cannot be used 
as a writ of error, and petitioner has not met the burden of 
showing he exhausted below the defense upon which he must 
rely, [and] he is not entitled to relief." 
[7] The People next argue that petitioners have waived 
their plea of double jeopardy iu that they appealed their 
conviction, relying upon section 1262 of the Penal Code which 
provides: "If a judgment against the defendant is reversed, 
such reversal shall be deemed an order for a new trial, unless 
the appellate court shall otherwise direct. If the appellate 
court directs a final disposition of the action in the defendant's 
favor, the court must, if he is in custody, direct him to be 
discharged therefrom .... '' The People also rely on section 
1180 of the Penal Code which provides: "The granting of a 
new trial places the parties in the same position as if no trial 
had been had. All the testimony must be produced anew, and 
the former verdict or finding cannot be used or referred to, 
either in evidence or in argument, or be pleaded in bar of any 
conviction which might have been had under the accusatory 
pleading." There is obviously no merit to this contention. In 
that line of cases holding that double jeopardy attaches when 
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a conviction has been had on a necessarily included offense 
(In re Hess, 45 Cal.2d 171 [288 P.2d 5]; People v. Greer, 
30 Cal.2d 589 [184 P.2d 512] ; People v. McFarlane, 138 Cal. 
481 [71 P. 568, 72 P. 48, 61 L.R..A. 245]; People v. Smith, 134 
Cal. 453 [66 P. 669]; People v. Gordon, 99 Cal. 227 [33 P. 
901] ; People v. Kn~pa, 64 Cal..App.2d 592 [149 P.2d 416]) 
the Penal Code sections relied upon by the People have not 
been considered as a bar to a plea of double jeopardy. 
Insofar as the People's contention reaches the question 
of waiver, because of defendants' successful appeal from 
the petty theft conviction, the matter was admirably discussed 
in the Green case where it was held: "Using reasoning which 
purports to be analogous to that expressed by Mr. Justice 
Holmes in Kepner [Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (24 
S.Ct. 797, 49 L.Ed. 114)], the Government alternatively 
argues that Green, by appealing, prolonged his original 
jeopardy so that when his conviction for second degree mur-
der was reversed and the case remanded he could be tried 
again for first degree murder without placing him in new 
jeopardy. We believe this argument is also untenable. What-
ever may be said for the notion of continuing jeopardy with 
regard to an offense when a defendant has been convicted of 
that offense and has secured reversal of the conviction by 
appeal, here Green was not convicted of first degree murder 
and that offense was not involved in his appeal. If Green had 
only appealed his conviction of arson and that conviction had 
been set aside surely no one would claim that he could have 
been tried a second time for first degree murder by reasoning 
that his initial jeopardy on that charge continued until every 
offense alleged in the indictment had been finally adjudicated. 
"Reduced to plain terms, the Government contends that in 
order to secure the reversal of an erroneous conviction of one 
offense, a defendant must surrender his valid defense of 
former jeopardy not only on that offense but also on a different 
offense for which he was not convicted and which was not 
involved in his appeal. Or stated in the terms of this case, 
he must be willing to barter his constitutional protection 
against a second prosecution for an offense punishable by death 
as the price of a successful appeal from an erroneous convic-
tion of another offense for which he has been sentenced to five 
to twenty years' imprisonment. .As the Court of .Appeals said 
in its first opinion in this case, a defendant faced with such a 
'choice' takes a 'desperate chance' in securing the reversal 
of the erroneous conviction. The law should not, and in our 
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judgment does not, place the defendant in such an incredible 
dilemma. Conditioning an appeal of one offense on a coerced 
surrender of a valid plea of former jeopardy on another of-
fense exacts a forfeiture in plain conflict with the constitu-
tional bar against double jeopardy." (Pp. 226-227.) 
Under the theory presented in the case at bar by the 
People, these defendants would be forced to choose between 
appealing an erroneous conviction of petty theft and their 
constitutional guarantee that they shall not twice be placed 
in jeopardy for a charge of grand theft. People v. Green, 
47 Cal.2d 209, 235 [302 P.2d 307], relied upon by the People 
is not pertinent. In the Green case defendant appealed 
from a conviction of first degree murder with the penalty 
fixed at death. We affirmed the judgment of first degree 
murder and reversed only so far as the penalty was con-
cerned. Petitioners here would have no claim that they were 
twice in jeopardy by being subjected to a second trial, after 
reversal by an appellate court, on the petty theft charge only. 
Here, as in the case of Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 
[78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199, 61 A.L.R.2d 1119], defendants 
were found guilty of the lesser crime and their appeal was 
from that judgment. [8] Double jeopardy attaches when 
they are threatened with a second trial on the greater charge 
of grand theft of which they were impliedly acquitted 
at the first trial where they were found guilty only of petty 
theft. People v. d'A Philippa, 140 Cal.App. 236 [35 P.2d 
134], also relied upon by the People is not in point. In the 
d'A Philippo case, the defendant was pronounced an habitual 
criminal. This court set aside that particular adjudication on 
the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction to sentence 
him as an habitual criminal and reversed the judgment with 
" ... ' ... directions to the court below to resc:ntence defend-
ant, as required by law. (220 Cal. 620 [32 P.2d 962].)'" 
The appellate court held that the resentencing of the defend-
ant did not constitute double jeopardy. 
[9] The People contend, finally, that neither prohibition 
nor mandamus are proper remedies at this time. It is again 
argued that petitioners did not raise the plea of double 
jeopardy as provided for in sections 1016 and 1017 of the 
Penal Code. As previously shown by the record, the plea 
was raised in accord with the statutes and the remedies sought 
are proper. In Jackson v. S1tperior Cot[rt, 10 Cal.2d 350, 353 
[74 P.2d 243, 113 A.L.R. 1422], the same point was made 
by the respondents, and quoting from the opinion of the 
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District Court of Appeal in the same case, it was said:" 'Re-
spondents urge that the writ [prohibition) should not be 
issued because petitioners possess a plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy at law whereby they may preserve the rights which 
they hope to protect in this proceeding, They maintain that 
the plea of former jeopardy is one which the petitioners may 
or may not enter, their action depending on themselves and 
their counsel; that if the trial court was in error in refusing 
their request to enter these pleas, and was in error in con-
cluding that jeopardy had not attached, those questions might 
be raised on appeal if they should be convicted at their second 
trial, and would serve as a sure ground for reversal of the 
judgments which might be pronounced against them, which re-
versals would result in their discharge after the appeal had 
been decided. That the right to raise this question on appeal 
is plain cannot be doubted. That it is either speedy or ade-
quate is open to serious question .... In view of the consider-
able discretion vested in us in issuing these writs we are 
constrained to hold that while the remedy at law is plain 
it is neither speedy nor adequate under the facts before us 
and especially in view of the fact that in its final analysis 
the question before us is one of the jurisdiction of respondents 
to again place petitioners on trial for the offenses charged in 
the indictment found against them. (M enjou v. Superior 
Court, 128 Cal.App. 117 [16 P.2d 1007]; Ilnntington v. Supe-
rior Court, 5 Cal.App. 288 [90 P. 141] ; Oliver v. Superior 
Court, 92 Cal.App. 94 [267 P. 764].)'" 
[lb] It is our opinion that there is no sound basis for the 
distinction heretofore drawn by the courts of this state insofar 
as lesser included offenses and degree crimes are concerned 
and that petitioners here should be considered as having been 
once in jeopardy. Inasmuch as the facts here presented bring 
petitioners squarely within the constitutional prohibition 
against placing a defendant twice in jeopardy, it is unneces-
sary for us to determine whether the prohibition against 
double jeopardy is part of the due process clause. 
The writs should issue as prayed for, and it is so ordered. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
Spence, J., concurred in the judgment. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent, for the reasons stated by Mr. 
Presiding Justice Van Dyke in the opinion prepared by him 
for the District Court of Appeal in Gomez v. Supe1·ior Court 
of Mendocino County, (Cal.App.) 322 P.2d 292. 
